



FREEDOM DAY: OPPOSITION AND THE GOVERNMENT IN THE 
OLD FORMAT 
 
It was repeated many times before the recent Freedom Day (the unofficial 
celebration of the proclamation of the Belarusian Democratic Republic on 25 
March 1918 – BISS), that this should be the test for the Belarusian authorities: 
are they ready for the dialogue with Europe and the minimal democratization. 
At the same time, the action on 25 March 2007 was also the test for the 
opposition: will it be capable of rebuilding itself and finding a new strength after 
the presidential elections of 2006? The answer to both questions is negative.  
 
The United Democratic Forces (UDF) approached the anniversary of the (19 March 2006 
presidential) elections in its previous format, which was not very workable, and eventually 
came to be completely eroded. The problem is not only the permanent battle for leadership 
and the resources. The main problem is the conceptual crisis. The strategy and action plan 
of the UDF adopted after the elections came to be the thing in itself. First of all, the 
opposition failed to create a broad movement of the supporters of changes, which was the 
opposition’s best bet to increase its popular base. Last year’s period of political activism was 
wasted. Alexander Milinkevich began to work on this project (whose success was not self-
evident anyway) only after his leadership position in the Political Council of UDF became 
shaken and he needed a new base. Moreover, according to opponents, the personal 
composition of the movement “For Freedom” largely represented members of the parties 
lured into the movement, which only exacerbated the coalition crisis.  
 
Overall, an antagonistic cleavage between the supporters of Milinkevich and the rest of the 
opposition had been formed by the time the anniversary of the mass protest against the 
official results of last year’s presidential elections was to be celebrated. The rest seek a new 
Congress of Democratic Forces to reform the opposition and work out the new program 
documents (even though some experts, based on the announcements, express doubts in the 
conceptual strengths of the proposed resolutions of the congress).  
 
The idea of a symbolic remake of the Square came to life in the fall of 2006. However, the 
opposition failed the campaign in favor of this idea during last year’s presidential elections. 
They wasted time setting up the date for the action that had to initiate a new “hot spring” of 
protests. As a result, the opposition chose not 19 March (the anniversary of last year’s 
elections) but 25 March, the traditional opposition Freedom Day. This also diluted the idea 
of the action. 
 
Against the background of the internal fight within the coalition, it is logical that the 
preparation to the Freedom Day was far from being coherent. Time and effort was wasted, 
for example, to discuss the aesthetics of the advertisement. Mutual recriminations of a quiet 
sabotage were pronounced. Deputy leader of the Belarusian Social Democratic Party Anatol 
Laukovich withdrew from the group of initiators of the action before the event. 
Communists, for whom the May Day is major spring holiday, ignored the event. Only the 
open letter of Milinkevich to the president and the appeal of the group of intellectuals to the 
government to recognize 25 March as the starting point of national consolidation for the 
defense of independence and the civilizational European future of Belarus could be 
considered as a political know how.  
Observers also noticed shortcomings in the conduct of the action, For example, several 
meeting points around the October square eased the task for security forces to dissect the 
protesters. The rally was organized according to the standard scenario, and people began to 
disperse after the first speeches. Most importantly, rank and file participants could not hear 
a clear message. Hence, the political opponents of the government face a pressing issue of 
the strategy, key ideas, and algorithm of actions. 
  
Soon after the last year’s elections, some opposition leaders bet on the pro-independence 
rhetoric. They span the threat of a hypothetical referendum on the union with Russia and 
proposed to create a block “For Independence.” But in reality, the slogans of sovereignty 
had long stopped being the monopoly of the opposition; they were quietly appropriated by 
the official leader, who, during the “oil and gas war,” de-facto positioned himself as a 
defender of sovereignty from the “energy empire.” Also failed was the hope on the 
upcoming economic crisis and, correspondingly, swift politicization of ordinary citizens after 
the energy price hikes.  
 
It is evident that the cleavage between the tiny titular opposition restricted to its own circle, 
and a numerous (20-30%, according to various data) layer of hard-line opponents of the 
political regime. The phenomenon of the Square, series of flash mobs and some other 
picturesque expressions of the political protest were the result of self-organization of the 
supporters of changes, on whom the leadership of UDF is theoretically based. Titular 
opposition leaders have no authority in the eyes of a large part of the democratically minded 
compatriots. It goes without saying that the UDF have no tools to influence other groups of 
the electorate. Even while the oppositions options are strictly limited by the authoritarian 
regime, it tends to chose the worst scenarios within the narrow corridor of available 
options. The academic nature of the opposition leadership was highlighted by the recent 
local elections and the “oil and gas war.” A beneficial chance for public relations and political 
positioning was wasted. Lousy actions of the UDF allowed some analysts to affirm that the 
titular opposition was in principle unable to formulate and implement strong answers to the 
challenges of the time.  
 
Anyway, the West is obviously unable to integrate a small, disunited opposition into the 
proposed dialogue with the government. At the same time, the break-up of the opposition 
coalition, apart from the personal ambitions of leaders and the struggle for resources, is 
further encouraged by the absence of coordination in the “Belarusian issue” between the 
West and Russia. “Pro-Western” and “Pro-Russian” wings of the opposition exchange 
mutual accusations in the betrayal of national interests.  
 
As for the government, it applied the repressive know-how of preventive cleansing that was 
first introduced one year ago. Before and directly during 25 March, several dozens, up to 
100, opposition activists were arrested. One third of them were sentenced to brief jail 
terms, usually on trademark charges of swearing in public. Others were simply kept at police 
stations. The police also intimidated potential protesters. The authorities obviously tried to 
demonstrate strength while not infuriating the West. That is why the protesters were not 
let into the October square, one column was dispersed by force. Otherwise, however, 
compared to other Freedom Days, there was no usual brutality. And the organizers have 
been spared from punitive acts so far, even though it was usually done on previous 
occasions. 
 
The novelty in political technology was the organization of two official performances on 25 
March under the slogan “for Independent Belarus!” Those concerts gave the head of state an 
opportunity to accuse the opposition of destructive acts. “We gave them best spaces, please 
come … but they don’t want to do it together, why? Because if they act together with the 
government the West won’t give them money. This is a destructive opposition.”  
At the same time, it should not be ruled out that the authorities will try to gradually 
assimilate this date. The head of state deprived opposition opponents of the monopoly on 
pro-independence rhetoric. Now, the monopoly on the Freedom Day can be diluted as well. 
Hence, the opposition once again faces the problem of political creativity.  
 
Postfactum, talking to journalists on 28 March, Alexander Lukashenka gave an indirect 
answer to the calls to a dialogue pronounced  by the opposition leaders. He declared that 
the opposition does not represent a serious force, and hence there was no need to change 
tactics in relations with it.  
 
Hence, it is obvious that the government will try to stick to the existing political model for 
as long as it is possible, allowing under the pressure of circumstances only minimal cosmetic 
changes. In the relations with the West, first of all the European Union, it will most likely use 
the tactics of a protracted game with a home that the EU would eventually retreat from the 
demands of democratization in order to solve the pragmatic issues, such as energy security.  
 
At the same time, the Belarusian leadership is aware of the systemic threats presented by 
the Kremlin’s new policies and at the same time the growing pressure by the West. One can 
presume that the official leader is far more concerned about the relations with the pro-
democratic part of the society (much broader than the titular opposition) and the West 
(first of all because of the Russian pressure). 
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